NEC 517 violation

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mbrooke

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On the essential side I would require two generators, each capable of carrying the entire connected load. The generator parallel switchgear shall have generator main breakers and a tie breaker.


What do you think about slide 22, and slide 31 onward?

https://www.slideshare.net/michaeljmack/standby-power-systems-for-hospitals


I have an thoughts about paralleling... though I'd wouldn't mind being told otherwise.



Design two critique and/or suggestions for improvement. Why I share your viewpoint about some codes (not to mention AHJ), I feel we have no choice but to adhere to them.

Well... lets just say I may have the luxury of being the AHJ :happyyes:;):angel: Ideally, when any man is not bound dogma, given free will without bound to chains and weights >>>

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mbrooke

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Take a quick look at the following links. I am making the assumption that fused mains equates to "bolted pressure contact switch". In certain applications, say an industrial plant where planned outages are not a problem and you have a qualified staff, I think they are the right choice. Just not for a hospital with staff that isn't as knowledgeable and an administration bent on constant 24/7/365 operation.

For example, are you aware that at least one manufacturer of bolted pressure contact switches requires that if it ever opens a fault it may not be returned to service without maintenance? Pretty much all of them require annual maintenance. That is going to require a complete shutdown of all POCO feeders in your designs. Good luck on getting any hospital to obey that.

http://apps.geindustrial.com/publib...OARDS?TNR=White Papers|GEAR-OR-BOARDS|generic

https://www.munichre.com/site/hsb/g...News/In-The-News/2016/main-switch-failure.pdf

Thanks- I'll read up on that. I wish manufacturers took bolted pressure switches as seriously as they took breakers...

Circuit breakers offer much longer service intervals. You don't have guys hunting for the proper fuse and needing to know where a torque wrench is. I have seen folks harm these switches and themselves but not knowing how to charge springs. Some people get in a downright panic mode and just can't think clearly. Keep in mind these switches are good for thousands of no load operations but relativity few full load operations. If they have ground fault protection they will be subjected to more full load breaks than is desired. Staff might not be knowledgeable enough to understand the need to open all downstream devices before closing. I have seen them fail and it isn't pretty. They tend to be "custom built" so it takes a lot of time for factory engineers to come in and re-engineer a solution or rebuild them on-site. Throw in portable generators, interruption of service cost, etc, and you are going to be looking at nearly a million bucks+ per incident. I'll gladly take the draw out breaker that I can talk most any idiot thru changing out.

IMO:

Circuit breakers are more likely to fail. It is much harder to selectively coordinate them, especially when short circuit power and source positive, negative and zero sequence components change.

Properly coordinated fuses do not blow unless there is an actual fault between the blown fuse and the next down stream device. Replacing fuses or resting a tripped breaker both may not be a good idea until a cause is determined.

However, I do agree with you load break switches need to change and need to be designed more like breaker contacts. Perhaps draw out fuses should also be offered by manufacturers like in POCO environment.


Paralleling generator gear allows me the means to effectively double the capacity of my generators on loads that can be a delayed transfer, such as the equipment branch. I would never sign off on a single generator so the ability to parallel isn't that much of an extra cost.


At the expense of common mode failures. At the expense of inviting temptation to place all the gen sets in the same room, often without barrier between them. And at the expense of cost, where the same money could go into more gensets/ATS/hardening.


You might be able to avoid ground fault requirements under the "less than 150 volts to ground" loophole but I don't think this is in the best interest of anyone. Well maybe it is in the best interest of bean counters that think catastrophic faults never happen and people are expendable commodities.

Why can't a fuse or breaker do what a GF does? I've never understood code's justification fully and considering how science was "re-invented" to get AFCIs into the code I've seen enough to question it- to say the least.

I mean my God people. EE's design far more robust electrical system for data and telecommunications sites than they do hospitals. Medical errors are now the third leading cause of death and it isn't just heart attacks and bacteria. System failures are a part of this. Damn the cost and the minimal requirements of code. Do what is right and just don't even offer them less than what is right. If every EE did so the field would be even. Sadly, one of these days, almost every one of us will end up in a hospital and be dependent on its ability to keep us alive. Lets do our part to make sure they have what it needs in an electrical infrastructure to keep us alive.

Because honestly, code is partly to blame. (The rest is manufacturers up-selling expensive gear/solutions and hospital not willing to invest much beyond code minimum.)


In data centers the main branch is 3x replicated with each branch on its own ATS and own generator(s). Each server has 3 sources of independent power. Where as an OR or ICU has some 40 red receptacles on the same critical branch and a few vanilla receptacles in some obscure place like behind the bed, behind the boom or on the OR wall down low away from the operating table.

Now imagine the same approach to an OR: 3 normal independent branches with 100% selective coordination each feeding 1/3 of the 40 red receptacles. Perhaps each labelled as to what branch.
 

mbrooke

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Roger that Roger and I didn't intend to suggest otherwise although I am certainly guilty of doing so.

:roll: American exceptionalism has no mercy here. You do know outside of NFPA countries typically the essential system resembles one 150kva and under (one ATS or throw over scheme) and half the time sub-division is minimal. There are no documented problems when coordinated and maintained correctly.



https://www.siemens.be/in/documenta...novative_Power_Distribution_for_Hospitals.pdf


With that said I'm still open to critique.
 

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mbrooke

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Case without selective coordination:


https://www.ecmweb.com/cee-news-archive/emergency-critical-condition-hospital-power

At 1:25 a.m. on Oct. 3, 1998, a ground fault occurred in a 25 hp fan motor supplied from a motor control center located on the second floor of the existing building. The protective device in the motor control center did not trip, nor did it trip the upstream feeder circuit beaker that supplied this MCC via an automatic transfer switch (ATS). The main breaker for the existing power center thus operated and removed power from the faulted system. This resulted in a loss of power to half of the existing facility. All power was lost to the critical care loads, including life support and patient isolation ventilation systems.

Subsequent to the main circuit breaker trip, all automatic transfer switches sensed the loss of power. A signal was sent to start the emergency generators. Once the generators started, the automatic transfer switches operated and re-established a supply of power to the emergency system. The emergency power was not supplied for long since the ground fault was still present at the 25hp fan. The circuit breaker on the emergency system feeding all the transfer switches tripped, resulting in the complete loss of power to the hospital.

Fortunately, the medical staff, trained for this type of emergency, reacted without delay. Several patients on respirators were in severe danger of suffocating. The medical staff manually operated bag valve masks that breathed for the patients. After 20 minutes, the fault was isolated and power was restored with no harm to any patients.

Which is why I say its not the subdivision, but the total discrimination of every OCPD.
 

mbrooke

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Ok, so here is my thought process. Picture a facility requiring full backup. This is becoming the norm more and more often due to hurricanes and the need for cooling during blackouts. 3000 kw worst case peak as an example (see attacked picture).




1) Four 1000kw generators or six 600kw generators feeding into parallel switch-gear, 5 to 12 ATSs. Cost is allocated into paralleling gear and a dedicated critical branch. While N-1 is afforded in that any one generator can fail or be taken out of service- several common mode failure points exist. The paralleling gear electronics, the gear's busbar and the generators being all at the same location. It looks elegant and the manufacturer like the $$$$.

2) Three 1,250kw generators (or 4 900kw) seeded at different points in the basement preferably in the building- one in the sublevel basement, one on a roof mezzanine, the other on a middle level elevation. Each with their own day tank and independent fuel supply from a flood proof tank farm. Each feeds its own ATS and in turn 3 branches with all load evenly distributed among them. Each separately distributed through out the building. The reserve 250kw in each genset is such that if one fails or its ATS, important cord and plug connected loads can be placed on the renaming branches.

OR, NICUs, ICUs and the ER will get all 3 (or 4 branches) at the headwells, booms, PBPUs and at least two for corridor/room lighting. Purple circuits run overhead through the drop ceiling coming north, Orange originating east/west direction and Brown circuits running from underneath the floor slab. Residency dorms brown for lights orange for receptacles- in alternation 6 configs. Electrical rooms, mechanical rooms, elevators rooms, ect having at least 50% of the lighting and outlets on one branch 50% on another. ATS, branch gear and genset rooms two branches 50/50 preferably not affiliated with the gear at hand. Stair wells two risers from different branches or stairwell A has a Purple riser with floor one having an Orange fixture at the landing floor in the stair well two a brown fixture off the hall lighting in the well, floor three orange ect in alternation. Elevator rooms may have manual throw over abilities provided elevators are interlocked for controlled car release during the failure of one branch.


I will give you that the above design will frequently run the generators at less then half load due to oversizing for inrush and load transfer in addition to varying HVAC loads based on time of year.


However, this systems achieves true 3x (or 4x) without any common failure points that most hospitals- even the top notch facilities- simply do not achieve while paying more in capitol costs and then maintenance costs in the long run.




http://www.dewberry.com/docs/defaul...ting_Management_May_2009.pdf?sfvrsn=e5b7bf9_0
 

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Russs57

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The Siemens design is vastly superior. I like that they bring normal, essential, and UPS power to all important loads. I would cry with joy if America had such requirements.

The generators in different locations is a better/safer approach. In an area prone to hurricanes I wouldn't want them in a basement nor a roof. I might also like to see load shedding ability and automatic means of backup between them. But hey, I'm reasonable and know I can't have everything I want.

We could argue about the wisdom of having several sources in OR vs most sources from a common iso panel but the iso transformer being fed from those "several sources" (like the Siemens design). You certainly need some of both (mostly because a lot of equipment in an OR doesn't belong on iso power systems). In my experience you aren't going to have doctors and nurses trying multiple outlets until they discover a live one. Still, I favor your overall concepts.

To be clear I don't have a problem with fuses. I have more of a problem with the switches.

As long as there is a requirement for ground fault on mains you run the risk "of that 25 HP motor" crashing the whole system (heck I have seen dead shorts from a #12 off a 20 amp mccb take out a 2,000 main and it isn't a coordination problem). That is why I like a lot of little ATS's, ground fault breakers on each source, and fuses at every motor.

We all learn from experience, but we all have different experiences, so we tend to have different solutions.
 

mbrooke

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The Siemens design is vastly superior. I like that they bring normal, essential, and UPS power to all important loads. I would cry with joy if America had such requirements.


True, but there is one ATS or rather set of breakers that open and close into the gen. Thats the point I'm trying to make- you can have a vastly superior design and violate the NEC doing so. I don't like that.

The generators in different locations is a better/safer approach. In an area prone to hurricanes I wouldn't want them in a basement nor a roof. I might also like to see load shedding ability and automatic means of backup between them. But hey, I'm reasonable and know I can't have everything I want.

I know this: If you flood a gen on the roof/mid level is a good idea. If a tornado roles through having them in the basement is best. I've read cases where either one would have saved the day.


We could argue about the wisdom of having several sources in OR vs most sources from a common iso panel but the iso transformer being fed from those "several sources" (like the Siemens design). You certainly need some of both (mostly because a lot of equipment in an OR doesn't belong on iso power systems). In my experience you aren't going to have doctors and nurses trying multiple outlets until they discover a live one. Still, I favor your overall concepts.

That is unless lit. :p

JUNG_A521KIUFWW.png


Which I think the NEC had similar reasoning. Down side is line-line connected systems with a blown feeder fuse. Voltage can bob up and down creating a whole lot of confusion as to why the lit outlet is now dying. Its this that has me debating what to do.

Transferring the fixed lighting would require an ATS.


To be clear I don't have a problem with fuses. I have more of a problem with the switches.

As long as there is a requirement for ground fault on mains you run the risk "of that 25 HP motor" crashing the whole system (heck I have seen dead shorts from a #12 off a 20 amp mccb take out a 2,000 main and it isn't a coordination problem). That is why I like a lot of little ATS's, ground fault breakers on each source, and fuses at every motor.

We all learn from experience, but we all have different experiences, so we tend to have different solutions.


Which is why I like not having GF. Fuses provide 100% selective coordination even when they have not been "touched" for 40 years.


I think switches need to change. Manufacturers are to focused on breakers.
 

mbrooke

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The Siemens design is vastly superior. I like that they bring normal, essential, and UPS power to all important loads. I would cry with joy if America had such requirements.

The generators in different locations is a better/safer approach. In an area prone to hurricanes I wouldn't want them in a basement nor a roof. I might also like to see load shedding ability and automatic means of backup between them. But hey, I'm reasonable and know I can't have everything I want.

We could argue about the wisdom of having several sources in OR vs most sources from a common iso panel but the iso transformer being fed from those "several sources" (like the Siemens design). You certainly need some of both (mostly because a lot of equipment in an OR doesn't belong on iso power systems). In my experience you aren't going to have doctors and nurses trying multiple outlets until they discover a live one. Still, I favor your overall concepts.

To be clear I don't have a problem with fuses. I have more of a problem with the switches.

As long as there is a requirement for ground fault on mains you run the risk "of that 25 HP motor" crashing the whole system (heck I have seen dead shorts from a #12 off a 20 amp mccb take out a 2,000 main and it isn't a coordination problem). That is why I like a lot of little ATS's, ground fault breakers on each source, and fuses at every motor.

We all learn from experience, but we all have different experiences, so we tend to have different solutions.

You don't have to answer- but if you were given the task to design a hospital power system- with the criteria of 3x power in critical areas- how would you do it? You don't have to follow code if you'd like- just what you believe give the best results.



.......................................
 

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romex jockey

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I mean my God people. EE's design far more robust electrical system for data and telecommunications sites than they do hospitals. Medical errors are now the third leading cause of death and it isn't just heart attacks and bacteria. System failures are a part of this. Damn the cost and the minimal requirements of code. Do what is right and just don't even offer them less than what is right. If every EE did so the field would be even. Sadly, one of these days, almost every one of us will end up in a hospital and be dependent on its ability to keep us alive. Lets do our part to make sure they have what it needs in an electrical infrastructure to keep us alive.

I'll take the risk on steppin' into the 'EE zone' :bye: and ask what is probably a :dunce: design Q....

Gennys & ATS's aren't instantaneous, if so they'd fire with every poco bump

That said, i just did a 'critical loads' panel fed via PV array through an inverter/battery deal that is....

Not a whole lotta 'umph' , but certainly cost effective for point of use requirements...

~RJ~
 

mbrooke

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All in all I am hearing this: ATSs are the most likely to fail. They need service. Further, VA design rules limit ATSs to 800amps max. Not sure why, but it may have something to with serviceability racking/unracking. More ATSs is better- though the down side is the gen needs its own switch board.


20/80 or 50/50 design in most critical areas:
 

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Russs57

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I don't have the time to look over what you have posted and give a comprehensive answer now. Maybe this weekend.

Right now I'll just say a few words about "weak points".

For example, if we look at the Siemens design, you have these long bus bar trunks that have taps all over the place. If for some reason the bus bar developed a fault (and I have seen it happen), everything comes crashing down.

So, I like to have lots of little feeders and ATS's. I want ATS's as close to the load as possible. I want ground fault protection to all feeders on all ATS's. This way any fault will clear before I trip any other breakers and I have only lost one load at worst. I can also feel confident in trying to reset and re-energize that load, even if it turns out to be a bolted fault. I haven't had a problem with ATS failure rate but all of mine were tested weekly, under full load, and used to be serviced regularly (plus I had repair parts on hand and knew how to fix them). I take it the "past tense" part won't be lost on you.

I very much like the idea of utility, essential, and UPS power being brought to each ATS. I am not familiar with ATS's that allow three inputs and am not accustomed to seeing ATS's in series with each other. I would think a contactor based ATS could handle this design issue (but I don't think I care for them).

I have seen single point failures related to a fuel delivery systems. Some EE's don't seem to understand how they work and the need to have time delays on fuel tank solenoids and to reset those time delays when a pump fails. They don't seem to get that with a mechanical leak detection system you have a certain window of time to establish pressure, get out of low flow mode, energize the day tank solenoid, then prove rated full. Otherwise you fail/lock out that pump and the next pump starts. If you don't de-energize those day tank solenoids you will never build pressure and all remaining pumps will fail and lock out. Next you run all day tanks dry, typically plug all fuel filters, then generators re-crank time and time again until batteries are dead. Now you have no power anywhere, plugged filters, dead starting batteries, and not much to work with to re-establish power to facility. I have been there during a hurricane and it wasn't pretty.

I would want everything associated with my chillers, all towers/pumps/chillers/etc, to be on a totally separate generator system and POCO feeders in a detached building. This allows an "interrupt-able rate" of power from POCO, maybe even a load shed program. Cuts bottom line costs and removes the big loads from my essential generators.

I like your idea of "distributed generators" but I would want a way to tie loads together if a given generator failed. Seems like an ATS could do this without any parallel gear (maybe even a static switch?)

Most of all you need a system that the maintenance staff can understand and quickly diagnose. That is becoming harder, instead of easier, for some, as we move towards PLC's and BAS's systems with all these cute computer graphics that nobody looks at (or at least nobody that normally has grease on his hands). By removing the need for human intervention, in an attempt to automate everything, we are creating an environment unfriendly/incomprehensible to the humans charged with maintaining that environment (and I find this a sad commentary on my peers but it is a reality). It doesn't help that people want to protect intellectual property and without proper access you can't see the real decision making logic/programming.

The things you want to accomplish are not that hard to accomplish. All it takes is the right vision of a solution and the resources to carry it out. But if that vision/design doesn't take into account the peoples ability on staff/site to test, maintain, and especially to be able to know when it isn't working correctly......then you are screwed. And that might be the biggest disconnect and "single point of failure" of all in the EE community.
 

mbrooke

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I don't have the time to look over what you have posted and give a comprehensive answer now. Maybe this weekend.

Right now I'll just say a few words about "weak points".

For example, if we look at the Siemens design, you have these long bus bar trunks that have taps all over the place. If for some reason the bus bar developed a fault (and I have seen it happen), everything comes crashing down.

So, I like to have lots of little feeders and ATS's. I want ATS's as close to the load as possible. I want ground fault protection to all feeders on all ATS's. This way any fault will clear before I trip any other breakers and I have only lost one load at worst. I can also feel confident in trying to reset and re-energize that load, even if it turns out to be a bolted fault. I haven't had a problem with ATS failure rate but all of mine were tested weekly, under full load, and used to be serviced regularly (plus I had repair parts on hand and knew how to fix them). I take it the "past tense" part won't be lost on you.

All good- I appreciate it- thank you :) :) Its the past tense experience that I need pick for knowledge :happyyes:


Why many little ATSs?


I could be wrong, but to my understanding smaller ATSs create multiple risers/taps and as such more cost.


Generally I see (though I could be thin) multiple ATSs with one (or more) emergency risers in buildings where the backup power is a small percentage of the main power.


In a hospital with 35-60% or even 100% backup power I think we would see double the risers.


I very much like the idea of utility, essential, and UPS power being brought to each ATS. I am not familiar with ATS's that allow three inputs and am not accustomed to seeing ATS's in series with each other. I would think a contactor based ATS could handle this design issue (but I don't think I care for them).


How Typical are ATSs in series? I like the idea, especially with a big fish little fish approach (ignore the load shed):

Essential_system_electrical_crqw6a.jpg





FWIW ASCO offers 3 source ATSs:


https://www.ascopower.com/us/en/product-range-presentation/66123-asco-three-source-system/



I have seen single point failures related to a fuel delivery systems. Some EE's don't seem to understand how they work and the need to have time delays on fuel tank solenoids and to reset those time delays when a pump fails. They don't seem to get that with a mechanical leak detection system you have a certain window of time to establish pressure, get out of low flow mode, energize the day tank solenoid, then prove rated full. Otherwise you fail/lock out that pump and the next pump starts. If you don't de-energize those day tank solenoids you will never build pressure and all remaining pumps will fail and lock out. Next you run all day tanks dry, typically plug all fuel filters, then generators re-crank time and time again until batteries are dead. Now you have no power anywhere, plugged filters, dead starting batteries, and not much to work with to re-establish power to facility. I have been there during a hurricane and it wasn't pretty.


Can you tell me more about this? Or do a write up? I admit I know nothing on this. And honestly I am one of those people you describe without time delays or needing to reestablish pressure.


I would want everything associated with my chillers, all towers/pumps/chillers/etc, to be on a totally separate generator system and POCO feeders in a detached building. This allows an "interrupt-able rate" of power from POCO, maybe even a load shed program. Cuts bottom line costs and removes the big loads from my essential generators.

I like your idea of "distributed generators" but I would want a way to tie loads together if a given generator failed. Seems like an ATS could do this without any parallel gear (maybe even a static switch?)


Why is it better to remove big loads from generators driving essentials?


Thats my plan. Having critical risers with ATSs in series.



Most of all you need a system that the maintenance staff can understand and quickly diagnose. That is becoming harder, instead of easier, for some, as we move towards PLC's and BAS's systems with all these cute computer graphics that nobody looks at (or at least nobody that normally has grease on his hands). By removing the need for human intervention, in an attempt to automate everything, we are creating an environment unfriendly/incomprehensible to the humans charged with maintaining that environment (and I find this a sad commentary on my peers but it is a reality). It doesn't help that people want to protect intellectual property and without proper access you can't see the real decision making logic/programming.

The things you want to accomplish are not that hard to accomplish. All it takes is the right vision of a solution and the resources to carry it out. But if that vision/design doesn't take into account the peoples ability on staff/site to test, maintain, and especially to be able to know when it isn't working correctly......then you are screwed. And that might be the biggest disconnect and "single point of failure" of all in the EE community.


All I can say is agree, YES!, thanks and yes :happyyes::happyyes:
 

mbrooke

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I would want everything associated with my chillers, all towers/pumps/chillers/etc, to be on a totally separate generator system and POCO feeders in a detached building. This allows an "interrupt-able rate" of power from POCO, maybe even a load shed program. Cuts bottom line costs and removes the big loads from my essential generators.

I like your idea of "distributed generators" but I would want a way to tie loads together if a given generator failed. Seems like an ATS could do this without any parallel gear (maybe even a static switch?)


Time and time again I'm seeing this in hospitals- feeding everything through parallel gear:

rocklands-b.jpg



I want to take the same and run it into individual gear/ATSs dedicated to one genset like this:


CSE1307_FPOWER01slider.jpg


So having 6-12 separate systems.
 

mbrooke

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Example to ponder- NYC 911call center and emergency management. Would you;

A: Feed all this into paralleling gear?

B: Have 6 separate emergency systems with only UPS/critical toggling between two?

(I want to see those electrically operate dampers go btw)
 

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mbrooke

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The case made for full power and paralleling:


the life safety branch .... these loads would include a very small percentage of a hospital’s total electrical system, typically 5% to 10% at most


Where life safety power would only be 5% of the building’s power requirement, the critical power system of a hospital could easily account for 25% or more of a hospital’s total power requirement.


The equipment system can easily account for 30% or more of the overall hospital electrical system.


In summary, the total amount of emergency power for most buildings (and therefore the amount of emergency distribution equipment needed) is typically 10% or less and consists of only that minimal amount of power needed to help people safely exit a building within the first few minutes of normal power interruption. For hospitals, emergency power becomes the life blood of a building without utility power and must be maintained throughout a power outage, which could last for days after a storm or other catastrophic event. As a result, it’s not unusual to see the emergency power of a hospital exceed 50% or 60% of the building’s total power needs. Also, as separate transfer switches are need for each type of load (life safety, critical, nondelayed automatic equipment, delayed automatic equipment, and delayed automatic or manual connection equipment loads), multiple ATSs are always needed for hospitals. For a 200,000-sq-ft hospital, eight or more transfer switches could be used. A similarly sized office building would typically have only two ATSs.


Given that:

1) The essential system today typically cares 50% to 60% of a facility's power;

2) X-rays go up after major storm events;

3) Need for Air conditioning and heating- 2003 blackout led to countless heat stroke cases going to ERs without ACs.

4) Power outages tend to last longer, if not a week (or more) due to climate change


For this reason hospitals are now starting to apply 100% backup power. The typical default is paralleled gen-sets in same room via a comprehensive gear package ($$$$). Critical areas have some level of N-1 at best. Still bound to old design and "fire centric" code.


I am lead to ponder if the same number of sets can stand alone- in theory giving true N-7 (8x) or what have you for critical.

Bear in mind the most comprehensive data centers are 3x at best at their servers.


Quoted from:

https://www.csemag.com/articles/specing-hospital-electrical-distribution-systems/


Page 5 onward:

https://www.floods.org/Files/Conf2017_ppts/H1_Low.pdf

I know my use of the term "fire centric" may sound a bit conceited particularly around moderation- however- these are not my words. Rather the collective opinion sprouting up in a post climate change society:
 

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