Power Outage at Heathrow Airport - Realiability and Resilience

Joao

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Location
portugal
Occupation
engineer
Any idea that what could happeded?

Harmonics issue?

No fire resistant concrete walls between power transformers?

Sprinkler system was not operational?

No redundancy?

Others?
 
Any idea that what could happeded?

Harmonics issue?

No fire resistant concrete walls between power transformers?

Sprinkler system was not operational?

No redundancy?

Others?
"
Firefighters are seen tackling the blaze at the electricity substation on Friday

A statement from the Met Police read: 'The Met's Counter Terrorism Command has been working with partners to establish the cause of the fire at the electricity sub-station in Hayes last week (21 March).

'Following enquiries to date, officers have found no evidence to suggest that the incident was suspicious in nature.

'As such, we are no longer treating this as a potentially criminal matter, although we continue to support other partners, including colleagues from National Grid, London Fire Brigade and SSEN, with whom we remain in close contact.

'Should any relevant new information or evidence come to light it will be looked at and considered as appropriate.'"

But I don't know.
 
We will never know with certainty what happened.

If they state unequivocally it was not terrorism there is at least a 1 in 3 chance it was. They can't very well admit it.

Or it could be bad design and/or defective parts. Or just bad luck.
 
We will never know with certainty what happened.

If they state unequivocally it was not terrorism there is at least a 1 in 3 chance it was. They can't very well admit it.

Or it could be bad design and/or defective parts. Or just bad luck.
But the entire Heathrow was shot down for many hours.................
 
I saw something in youtube and prepared some photos. Link for youtube is inside file.
 

Attachments

  • Heathrow Airport Power Outage Photos.pdf
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Id be more interested in knowing their routine maintenance and inspection results. Mainly on the insulation testing and gas/liquid testing.

Most of the time it is nothing nefarious but instead decay or lack of maintenance. All things fail given enough time.
 
Id be more interested in knowing their routine maintenance and inspection results. Mainly on the insulation testing and gas/liquid testing.

Most of the time it is nothing nefarious but instead decay or lack of maintenance. All things fail given enough time.
I agree - most of the time it is not. And failures do happen from to time. But this is not just a failure - it was a major disaster. A total shut shut down of one of the #largest airports in the world.
 
I agree - most of the time it is not. And failures do happen from to time. But this is not just a failure - it was a major disaster. A total shut shut down of one of the #largest airports in the world.

The shut down is a result of a design flaw. Fully redudant transformer adjacent with no blast wall. That means if the transformer fails catastrophically it will take out the one next to it.
 
The shut down is a result of a design flaw. Fully redudant transformer adjacent with no blast wall. That means if the transformer fails catastrophically it will take out the one next to it.
That transformer, yes. But the entire airport was shut down for two days !
 
That transformer, yes. But the entire airport was shut down for two days !
That is the design flaw. The transformers being that close with no wall meant that all the terminations, wire, protection equipment, etc. needed to be tested and repaired before they could energize the redundant transformer or even install a spare. All of it was damaged by the single transformer's failure.

If it were me, I would probably due a single breaker - single bus at different ends of the airport and use a 33kv or 16kv intertie PMH system to pad mounted transformers or have a intertie feeder to each sub with an additional breaker.
 
That is the design flaw. The transformers being that close with no wall meant that all the terminations, wire, protection equipment, etc. needed to be tested and repaired before they could energize the redundant transformer or even install a spare. All of it was damaged by the single transformer's failure.

If it were me, I would probably due a single breaker - single bus at different ends of the airport and use a 33kv or 16kv intertie PMH system to pad mounted transformers or have a intertie feeder to each sub with an additional breaker.
I'm sure that there is more to this. Look at this:

"A fire near Heathrow Airport has caused commuter chaos as train services suffer significant delays early this morning.

National Rail has announced that disruption is expected until midday.

The operator announced on its website: "A fire next to the track between Heathrow Terminals and London Paddington means trains running between these stations may be delayed by up to 30 minutes"

For Heathrow it was 2 days. I'm sure there was more to it than that.
 
The shut down is a result of a design flaw. Fully redudant transformer adjacent with no blast wall. That means if the transformer fails catastrophically it will take out the one next to it.
Yes but airport are feeding by 3 substations. So redundancy were available. I saw some comments about 11 kV ring that is not available downstream.
 
I'm sure that there is more to this. Look at this:

"A fire near Heathrow Airport has caused commuter chaos as train services suffer significant delays early this morning.

National Rail has announced that disruption is expected until midday.

The operator announced on its website: "A fire next to the track between Heathrow Terminals and London Paddington means trains running between these stations may be delayed by up to 30 minutes"

For Heathrow it was 2 days. I'm sure there was more to it than that.

Lets wait for preliminary report.
Id be more interested in knowing their routine maintenance and inspection results. Mainly on the insulation testing and gas/liquid testing.

Most of the time it is nothing nefarious but instead decay or lack of maintenance. All things fail given enough time.
Only final report could indicate it.
 
That is the design flaw. The transformers being that close with no wall meant that all the terminations, wire, protection equipment, etc. needed to be tested and repaired before they could energize the redundant transformer or even install a spare. All of it was damaged by the single transformer's failure.

If it were me, I would probably due a single breaker - single bus at different ends of the airport and use a 33kv or 16kv intertie PMH system to pad mounted transformers or have a intertie feeder to each sub with an additional breaker.
Design flaw? Those are big words to use against a system that was working great for a long time.
Maybe an installation failure? Also a big statement that isn't appropriate.
More than likely multiple things could have been done different if there were no limit to schedule, cost and schedule.
 
Design flaw? Those are big words to use against a system that was working great for a long time.
Maybe an installation failure? Also a big statement that isn't appropriate.
More than likely multiple things could have been done different if there were no limit to schedule, cost and schedule.

I wouldn't know what else to call it. Something should always work well during normal operation. I would call the design incomplete if it didn't. It is how things fail that proves where the lack of follow through is. Especially in critical infrastructure.
 
I wouldn't know what else to call it. Something should always work well during normal operation. I would call the design incomplete if it didn't. It is how things fail that proves where the lack of follow through is. Especially in critical infrastructure.
The airport operations may be considered critical now that there was a failure, but I've worked on loads of critical projects that during design and construction the schedule and cost make the criticality questionable from the owner / operator's standpoint.
 
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