NRC report is out
If you have access the NRC website, the document # is 081490318
For all others, here is a summary:
On March 23, 2008 at 2216 hrs, while at approximately 94.5% reactor power, as.
part of a planned coast down for a scheduled refueling outage, the 22 Main Boiler
Feed Pump (MBFP) {SJ} speed rapidly decreased to 2400 RPM. The speed reduction
resulted in reduced feedwater flow to steam generators (SG) {AB} lowering SG
water levels. Automatic Turbine runback initiated due to the speed reduction of
22 MBFP below 3300 RPM. Due to unloading of the 22 MBFP, Control Room (CR) {NA}
Operators performed immediate actions of Feedwater Abnormal Operating Procedure
{2-AOP-FW-l) and manually initiated a Reactor Trip (RT) {JC}. All control rods
{AA} fully inserted and all safety systems responded as expected. The event was
recorded in the Indian Point Corrective Action Program (CAP) as condition Report
CR-IP2-2008-01333. Immediately prior to the event a planner was photographing
the MBFP speed control {JK} Lovejoy signal processor power supplies {JX} for an
upcoming refueling outage. The event occurred when the planner had taken a fourth
picture at approximately 18 to 24 inches from the equipment. System Engineering
(SE) reviewed plant data and verified that at the time of camera use steam flow
to 22 MBFP turbine decreased very rapidly and 22 MBFP suction flow decreased to
approximately 2800 GPM. The Lovejoy signal processor contains both analog and
digital components with the digital regulation board (governor board) {90} the
main digital component. Engineering concluded that the cause of the malfunction
of the 22 MBFP Lovejoy controls was the camera based on discussion with Lovejoy
manufacturer and review of the camera specifications. The camera is rated by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as radio frequency interference (RFI)
device. The CR staff and planner were.not aware that just having a digital
camera turned on in close proximity to other digital equipment could cause a
problem. The planner had been taking pictures with the same camera in CR for the
last several months for outage preparation. The CR staff was used to having staff
members including engineers, simulator staff and Public Relations personnel
taking photographs in the CR. The planner request to CR staff to photograph
"power supplies" was allowed since previous activities had no adverse effect.
Planning personnel did not perceive a correlation between the use of a camera and
its effect on plant equipment but were aware of Security requirements for camera
use on site. The procedure for camera use on site is security procedure EN-NS-
214,"Camera Controls for Access and Use." The responsibility of SE performing a
technical evaluation was not listed under section "5.0 Responsibilities" of
procedure EN-NS-214, and the Indian Point Energy 'Center Nuclear Management Manual
(NMM) Review and Approval Form of new procedure EN-AD-101,"Change Management,"
did not indicate any requirement for cross-discipline review. Based on
interviews, no communication plan was used for the new procedure.
Here are some other NRC documents on the topic, it has happened before.
NRC: Bulletin 76-03: Relay Malfunctions - GE Type STD Relays:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/bulletins/1976/bl76003.html
Information Notice No. 83-83: Use of Portable Radio Transmitters Inside Nuclear Power Plants:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1983/in83083.html
Information Notice No. 86-15: Loss Of Offsite Power Caused By Problems In Fiber Optics Systems:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1986/in86015.html
Information Notice No. 97-82: Inadvertent Control Room Halon Actuation Due To A Camera Flash:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1997/in97082.html
